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NOTES
USING CONSTITUTIONAL ZONING TO
NEUTRALIZE ADULT ENTERTAINMENT-
DETROIT TO NEW YORK
I. Introduction
In an effort to prevent the spread of businesses specializing in
adult entertainment, the city of Boston in 1974 established the first
officially zoned adult entertainment district in the nation.' The des-
ignated purpose of the district was to contain all businesses special-
izing in adult entertainment to a two and one-half block downtown
area, commonly referred to asthe Combat Zone.2
In New York City, there is no officially designated adult enter-
tainment district, but the Times Square area, with its proliferation
of businesses specializing in adult entertainment, 3 would appear to
be this city's "Combat Zone." 4 To prevent the concentration of
businesses specializing in adult entertainment and their accompa-
nying problems, New York City has recently proposed new zoning
regulations.' Rather than using the Combat Zone concept of re-
1. Newsweek, Dec. 2, 1974, at 43.
2. Id. At its inception, there was little opposition to the adult entertainment district;
however, today it is the subject of many heated controversies. A strong pervading sense of
"anything goes" has developed from a "tacit understanding that the police were to direct
their law efforts outside the zone." N. Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1976, at 10, col. 1. The present
controversy in Boston is the result of two factors. Early in November, 1976, the then Police
Commissioner issued an internal police report citing gross incompetence and corrupt inatten-
tion by the police assigned to the Combat Zone. Recently two Harvard football players were
stabbed during a post season excursion into the area. Id.
Boston Police Commissioner Joseph M. Jordan stated that the effort to contain sexual
activity was a "failure." Although businesses specializing in adult entertainment may be
limited to this area, the district's prostitutes have been forced to areas outside the Combat
Zone by groups of "female muggers working the district." Id.
Boston will initiate a new crackdown using state liquor laws to prevent the solicitation of
alcoholic beverages by performers in adult entertainment establishments. Id. at col. 1. See
section III infra.
3. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1976, at Al, col. 4.
4. Unlike Boston's Combat Zone, businesses specializing in adult entertainment in New
York are not limited to the Times Square area. "More recently,these highly profitable busi-
nesses have been put in more fashionable areas like Lexington Avenue, between 50th and 60th
streets, and in lower Manhattan and downtown Brooklyn." Id. at Al, col. 4.
5. Proposed Amendments to the New York City Zoning Resolution: Hearings on Art. I,
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stricting adult entertainment businesses to a particular district, the
regulations propose that businesses specializing in adult entertain-
ment be dispersed throughout the city. The proposed regulations
provide for specific distances between individual adult entertain-
ment businesses' as well as specified distances between these busi-
nesses and residential districts.7
New York City's proposed zoning is almost identical to the De-
troit zoning regulations' which require not more than two regulated
uses within 1,000 feet of each other.' Through a series of amend-
ments in 1972, Detroit added businesses specializing in adult enter-
tainment to the list of regulated uses.'0 The zoning ordinances note
that these businesses have a deleterious effect on residential neigh-
II, & III Before the City Planning Comm 'n, COMPREHENSIVE CITY PLANNING CALENDAR [No.
211 10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as N. Y.C. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS].
6. N.Y.C. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS art. II, ch. 2, §32-462 states: "[N]o new adult use may
be established where, within an area circumscribed by a line of 1,000 feet perpendicular or
radial distance from the center of the zoning lot of the proposed new adult use two [three
depending on the particular district] or more adult uses presently exist."
7. N.Y.C. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS art. III, ch. 2, § 32-461 states: "[N]o adult use shall
be located within 500 feet of a residential district. The distance shall be determined by
measuring from the edge of the nearest residential district boundary to the closest lot line of
the zoning lot containing an adult use. " Id. See note 74 infra.
8. Compare DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE 742-G, §§ 32.007, 66.0000,
66.0101, and 9410300 (1972) and 891-G, ch. 68 (1974) with N.Y.C. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS art.
I, ch. 2, § 12-10, art. III, ch. 2, §§ 32-461 and 32-462, and art. VIII, ch. 3, § 73-35. There is
one major difference between the Detroit plan and the proposed New York amendments. The
Detroit regulations did not restrict the location of business that predated the effective date
of the zoning regulations. New York City's proposed amendments contain a plan for the
amortization of adult uses. See N.Y.C. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS art. III, ch. 2, § 32-464. Any
preexisting adult entertainment business that would violate the proposed amendment would
be required to terminate within one year of the effective date of the amendments. When there
is a violation because there are more than two or three adults uses, the proposed amendments
solve the problem of which business is to terminate by providing:
Whenever such concentrations are exceeded the number of adult uses shall be re-
duced to the permissible concentration level by terminating those adult uses closest
to the nearest resident district. Where two or more adult uses are located on different
stories within a single building the use located on the lower story is deemed to be closer
to the nearest residential district boundary. Where two adult uses are equidistant from
the nearest residential district boundary the adult use occupying the larger floor area
shall be the use which terminates.
Id.
9. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE 742-G § 66.0000 (1972).
10. Prior to the 1972 additions, the regulated uses included: bars, hotels, motels, pawn
shops, pool and billiard halls, public lodging houses, secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors,
and taxi dance halls. Id.
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borhoods."1 The businesses include adult book stores, adult motion
picture theaters, and adult mini motion picture theaters,'2 and
group "D" cabarets. 3
The regulation of businesses featuring adult entertainment raises
several constitutional questions involving the first, fourteenth, and
11. Id.
In the development and execution of this Ordinance, it is recognized that there are
some uses which, because of their very nature, are recognized as having serious objec-
tionable operational charcteristics, particularly when several of them are concentrated
under certain circumstances thereby having a deleterious effect upon the adjacent
areas. Special regulation of these uses is necessary to insure that those adverse effects
will not contribute to blighting or downgrading of the surrounding neighborhood ....
The primary control or regulation is for the purpose of preventing a concentration of
these uses in any one area ....
Uses subject to these controls are as follows:
Adult
Adult Book Store
Adult Motion Picture Theatre
Adult Mini Motion Picture Theater
Cabaret
Group "D" Cabarets
Id.
12. DrsTorr, MICH., OFFCIAL ZONING ORDINANCE 742-G § 32.007 (1972):
Adult Book Store
An establishment having a substantial or significant portion of its stock in trade,
books, magazines, and other periodicals which are distinguished or characterized by
their emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to "Specified Sexual Activi-
ties" or "Specified Anatomical Areas ....
Adult Motion Picture Theater
An enclosed building with a capacity of 50 or more persons used for presenting
material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describ-
ing, or relating to "Specified Sexual Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas"
Adult Mini Motion Picture Theater
[This is defined in the same manner as Adult Motion Picture Theater but distin-
guished by a seating capacity "for less than 50 persons."]
Numerous "Specified Sexual Activities" and "Specified Anatomical Areas" are exactly de-
fined in this section. Id.
See N.Y.C. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS art. I, ch. 2, § 12-10. New York, as Detroit, includes
among the regulated uses adult book stores (§ 12-10 (a)) and adult motion picture theaters
(§ 12-10 (b)) but it adds to the list of regulated adult uses adult coin operated facilities (§
12-10 (c)), and adult physical culture establishment (§ 12-10 (e)).
13. DErRorr, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE 742-G § 32.007 (1972).
"Group 'D' Cabaret
A cabaret which features topless dancers, strippers, male or female impersonators,
or similar entertainers." Id.
See N.Y.C. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS art. I, ch. 2, § 12-10 (d). New York does not limit its zoning
of topless dancing to establishments licensed to sell alcoholic beverages. Id.
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twenty-first amendments. The issues may be best examined in light
of two recent cases. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 4 two
adult movie theaters located within 1,000 feet of two other regulated
businesses were in violation of the 1972 Detroit zoning ordinance.' 5
The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance on the grounds that the
city of Detroit was interested only in attempting to regulate the
concentration of adult entertainment businessses in residential
areas and not the content of the entertainment featured by these
businesses."' This interest was a sufficient compelling state interest
to permit an infringement of first amendment rights.'7
In Felix v. Young,"' plaintiff's cabaret, which featured topless
dancing, was located within 1,000 feet of two other regulated uses
in violation of the 1972 -Detroit zoning regulation. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the zoning ordinance as valid within the
regulatory power of the twenty-first amendment."'
This Note will consider whether the zoning of businesses special-
izing in adult entertainment is a legitimate exercise of the state's
police power, analyzing its potential as a violation of the first
amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In addition, the Note will examine the validity of using
the twenty-first amendment to regulate adult entertainment busi-
nesses that serve alcoholic beverages.
II. Equal Protection-A Claim Against Zoning
The purpose of the state's police power, the power to define and
regulate, is to promote and protect the general welfare.'" It is well
established that the state may exercise its police power in the inter-
est of public safety, public health, public morals,2 ' peace and quiet,
14. 427 U.S. 50 (1976), rev'g sub nor. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d
1014 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'g sub nom. Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D.
Mich. 1974).
15. 427 U.S. at 54-55.
16. Id. at 71-73.
17. Id.
18. 536 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1976).
19. Id.
20. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877).
21. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 470-
71 (1877).
[Vol. V
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and law and order.22 This power is broad 3 and inclusive. 24 Legisla-
tion authorized by the state police power possesses a presumption
of validity.2
Zoning, the regulation of land use, 26 is an exercise of the state's
police power.27 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,2 1 the Su-
preme Court held that the state may classify land according to its
use, be it industrial, commercial, or residential, in the interest of
public health and safety. It would seem that a city, in the best
22. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954).
23. See Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
24. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
25. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1888); City of Ann Arbor v. Northwest
Park Constr. Corp., 280 F.2d 212, 223 (6th Cir. 1960). When an act or ordinance is questiona-
ble, the courts have held that the legislative decision should control. See, e.g., Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); Radice v. New York,264 U.S. 292,
294 (1924). Accordingly, decisions made by legislative bodies within the scope of their police
power as to the means to accomplish the stated objective should not be reappraised. See
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440, 2452 (1976); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 (1954); But cf. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95, 115-31 (1971). For this reason a
court will not question possible underlying legislative motive. See United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904); American Mini
Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1019 (6th Cir. 1975). The courts will question whether
the means used are within specific constitutional limitations. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917).
26. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); American Sign Corp.
v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651, 654 (1955); 1 C. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 1-
23 through 1-27 (3d ed. 1974).
27. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Boardman v. Davis,
231 Iowa 1227, 3 N.W.2d 608, 610 (1942); American Sign Corp. v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651,
654 (Ky. 1955); 440 E. 102nd St. Corp. v. Murdock, 285 N.Y. 298, 304, 34 N.E.2d 329, 331
(1941).
28. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
29. Id. at 387. The state is not limited to traditional zoning of residential and commercial
districts strictly for the purpose of better police and fire protection. See Id. at 380-94; Note,
Zoning: Permissible Purposes, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 202 (1950). The Supreme Court in Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), held that Congress could regulate land use to insure that a
community is "beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, [and] well-balanced
as well as carefully patrolled .... Id. at 33. The Court in Berman stated that Congress had
within its police power the ability to clean up slum neighborhoods to protect the general
public from disease, crime, and immorality but also to prevent the suffocating of a neighbor-
hood's spirit especially when substandard housing robs a neighborhood of its charm and
"makes it a place from which men turn." Id.
There is a basic difference between Berman and the city of Detroit zoning ordinances. The
Washington, D. C., slum clearance upheld in Berman was not achieved through the use of
zoning. The Congress used the power of eminent domain. However, one commentator de-
scribed the difference as "immaterial." B. SCHWARTZ, CONsTrrurIONAL LAW 188 (1972).
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interests of the general public, would have within its police power
the ability to zone the location of businesses specializing in adult
entertainment to preserve its urban residential neighborhoods.
In the exercise of the police power, state regulations may create a
classification. 0 The entire concept of zoning is based on the neces-
sary classification of land according to its use.3' The regulation of
adult book stores and adult motion picture theaters, based on the
content of the entertainment featured, involves a two-step equal
protection analysis. First, is the content of expression a valid basis
for creating a classification that will restrict the location where the
expression may be presented?" Second, how closely should the
courts scrutinize regulations which treat adult motion picture thea-
ters and adult book stores differently from all other motion picture
theaters and book stores?33
A. Content as a Basis of Classification
The 1972 Detroit zoning amendments regulate adult book stores,
adult motion picture theaters, and adult mini motion picture thea-
ters "distinguished or characterized by their emphasis on matter
depicting, describing, or relating to 'Specific Sexual Activities' or
'Specified Anatomical Areas'."34 The ordinance is not limited to
establishments dealing in entertainment: books, magazines, period-
icals or motion pictures judicially determined to be obscene. Thus
the entertainment and other materials are presumptively within the
protection of the first amendment.
Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the first amendment,
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of Speech. '35
Freedom of expression, however, is not an absolute right since ex-
pression may be restricted or prohibited." Not all expression is guar-
30. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
31. 1 J. METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING, 128 (1930). Such classifications, although
necessary, may create an inequality under the law by reason of the classification process. It
follows that the argument most often used to challenge zoning is the denial of equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment. Id.
32. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440, 2449-52 (1976).
33. Id. at 2452-53.
34. See note 12 supra.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
36. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1935); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
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anteed protection from regulation37 nor is all protected speech guar-
anteed complete unrestricted freedom.38 Expression protected by
the first amendment may be regulated as to its time, place and
circumstances; but the regulation must be completely neutral and
nondiscriminatory manifesting neither sympathy nor hostility to
the point of view expressed.39
In Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs,'0 two adult motion picture
theaters4 located within 1,000 feet of two other regulated uses were
in violation of the 1972 Detroit zoning ordinance regulating adult
motion picture theaters, adult mini motion picture theaters, and
adult book stores.42 The theater operators sought injunctions declar-
ing the ordinance unconstitutional and prohibiting its enforcement
for denying the unrestricted expression guaranteed by the first
amendment and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment.43
The district court held that Detroit's desire to maintain and pre-
serve the residential quality of its neighborhoods was a sufficiently
compelling state interest to permit the classification on the basis of
content, an incidental infringement of the first amendment.4
Nortown was reversed by the Sixth Circuit in American Mini
Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs (American Mini Theatres I)." Using a
strict scrutiny equal protection test, the court of appeals held the
622, 642 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 309-10 (1940).
37. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (defamation); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502
(1949) (speech as a criminal instrumentality); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942) (fighting words).
38. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-87 (1949); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931).
39. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-
55, 558 (1965); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941).
40. 373 F. Supp. 363, 365 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd sub nom. American Mini Theatres,
Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
41. 427 U.S. at 55. Of the two theaters, the Nortown was an established theater that began
to feature adult films on a regular basis, while the other, the Pussy Cat, a mini theater
converted from a corner gas station, planned to feature adult films. Id.
42. Id.
43, Id.
44. 373 F. Supp. at 371.
45. 518 F.2d 1014, 1021 (6t Cir. 1975).
1977]
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ordinance unconstitutional." The classification created by the ordi-
nance regulating places of adult entertainment restricted a funda-
mental first amendment right, free exercise of expression; and pro-
vided unequal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth
amendment." The Sixth Circuit found a compelling state interest,
but ruled that Detroit failed to prove "that the method which it
chose to deal with the problem at hand was necessary and that its
effect on protected rights was only incidental."4
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. (American Mini Thea-
tres II), 41 the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and upheld
the district court's decision. The Court held that the zoning regula-
tions were not prior restraints on protected first amendment rights' "
and that the content of expression may be regulated as to time,
place, and manner in a nondiscriminatory fashion.' The Court con-
cluded that the classification did not violate the equal protection
clause since it furthered the city's interest in preserving the charac-
ter of residential neighborhoods.2
The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether
speech is protected by the first amendment and whether protected
speech may be restricted or prohibited is based on its content."3 It
concluded that using content as the basis of regulating protected
speech is valid, provided the regulation is completely neutral with
respect to the point of view expressed."
The zoning amendments create a classification determined by the
content of the entertainment featured at adult motion picture thea-
46. Id. at 1020. The court of appeals seemed to use a much stricter strict scrutiny test
than the district court in Nortown. The district court required only that the ordinance be
"necessary to further a compelling State interest." 373 F. Supp. at 369. The Sixth Circuit
required a showing that the means used to implement the compelling state interest be the
least objectionable means. 518 F.2d at 1020.
47. Id. at 1020-21.
48. Id. at 1020.
49. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
50. Id. at 70-73. The Court held that, because neither the distributors nor the exhibitors
are denied access to the viewing public nor is the viewing public denied access to the book
stores or motion picture theaters, the market for adult entertainment is unrestrained. Id. at
62.
51. Id. at 63-70.
52. Id. at 62.
53. Id. at 63-70.
54. Id. at 69-70.
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ters, adult mini motion picture theaters, adult book stores, and
group "D" cabarets. In American Mini Theatre II, the Court im-
plied that the locational restriction differentiating between book-
stores and motion picture theaters on the basis of the content of
the entertainment featured was completely neutral. The Court dis-
tinguished Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville," where the city of
Jacksonville made it a public nuisance to exhibit motion pictures
at drive-in theaters that featured nudity which was visible from a
public street or a public place." The purpose of the Jacksonville
regulation was to protect its citizens from unnecessarily being sub-
jected to offensive expression.57 The Supreme Court held that the
broad effect of the ordinance prevented the exhibition of any
motion picture featuring scenes with nudity at drive-ins. The
Court concluded that this censorship of films based on their con-
tent alone could not be justified by "the limited privacy interest of
persons on the public streets,""8 or protection against children
viewing the film, 9 or as a traffic regulation.1°
The dissent in American Mini Theatres II cited Erznoznik as
"almost on 'all fours' " with American Mini Theatres 11.6 Although
both ordinances regulate the location of businesses featuring nudity,
the Detroit regulations can be distinguished. The Detroit regula-
tions restrict the exhibition of sexually explicit entertainment,
whereas the Jacksonville ordinance broadly restricted nudity per se
at drive-ins when visible from a public street or public place.2 The
Jacksonville ordinance was not aimed at sexually explicit nudity,
resulting in the prohibition of nudity on the drive-in screen even
when innocent and educational. While there are myriad locations
in Detroit which are 1,000 feet away from two other regulated uses, 4
55. 422 U.S. 205 (1975); see 427 U.S. at 71 n.35.
56. 422 U.S. at 206-07.
57. Id. at 208. It was also argued that the ordinance was justified as "a reasonable means
of protecting minors from this type of visual influence." Id. at 212, and as a traffic regulation
since nudity on the screen distracted passing motorists. Id. at 214.
58. Id. at 212.
59. The Court found the ordinance to be overbroad in this respect. Id. at 213-14.
60. The Court found the ordinance to be underinclusive in this respect. Id. at 214-15.
61. 427 U.S. at 88 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
62. Id.'at 71 n.35.
63. Id. See 422 U.S. at 211, 213.
64. 373 F. Supp. at 371.
19771
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there are few drive-in locations where the screen is not visible from
a public street or a public place. The Jacksonville ordinance effec-
tively prevented the showing of any nudity on drive-in screens."
Unlike the Jacksonville ordinance, the Detroit regulations did not
attempt to regulate the location of expression which, while not ob-
scene, was felt to be offensive. In American Mini Theatres II, the
Court held that the Detroit zoning amendments were evidenced by
neither sympathy nor hostility towards the content of the entertain-
ment featured at adult entertainment businesses."6 The 1972 Detroit
regulations made no judgment as to whether the content of adult
entertainment was offensive. The regulations were necessitated by
the effects of the location of the entertainment, i.e., the deteriora-
tion of residential neighborhoods resulting from the concentration
of businesses specializing in adult entertainment."
B. Selection of a Test
The 1972 Detroit zoning ordinances present the problem of how
carefully the courts should scrutinize the regulations. The degree of
scrutiny a court employs turns on the type of legislation. When
considering zoning regulations, a court normally utilizes a minimal
scrutiny test."8 However, zoning adult book stores, motion picture
65. 422 U.S. at 211.
66. 427 U.S. at 71 n.34. In Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the Supreme Court
unanimously struck down a Chicago ordinance prohibiting all but peaceful labor picketing
within 150 feet of a school while the school was in session as a violation of the equal protection
clause. The Chicago ordinance can be distinguished from the Detroit regulation. The Chicago
ordinance failed to retain the neutrality of time, place, and manner with respect to the
content of picketing prohibited. The regulation favored peaceful labor picketing over other
peaceful picketing without providing a sufficient justification for the unequal treatment. Id.
67. 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
68. The Court presumes the validity of legislation enacted within the scope of the state
police power. See Lindsley v. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). The Court uses a
minimal scrutiny test when considering the constitutional validity of social and economic
legislation. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961); Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926). The Court will uphold a classification provided it has a reasonable basis in fact and
it is rationally related to the stated purpose of the legislation. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76 (1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election,
394 U.S. 802, 808-09 (1969); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920). Traditionally the Court has used a minimal scrutiny test when zoning classifica-
tions have been challenged as a violation of the fourteenth amendment equal protection
[Vol. V
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theaters, and cabarets creates a classification among those estab-
lishments based on the content of entertainment presented to the
public." The ordinance regulates the free exercise of expression, a
fundamental right guaranteed by the first amendment.70 When a
fundamental right is restricted, a court is required to scrutinize the
regulating classification much more strictly."
In Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs,7" the district court used the
strict scrutiny test since the regulation restricted a fundamental
right protected by the first amendment.73 The court held that the
ordinance prohibiting more than two regulated businesses within
1,000 feet of each other was necessary to further a compelling state
interest, the preservation of urban residential neighborhoods.74 In
clause. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); Washington ex rel. Seattle
Title Trust Co., v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1928); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
69. 427 U.S. at 58, 65.
70. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
71. When the created classification is a suspect classification (see, e.g., Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)) or infringes on an individual's fundamental rights (see Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)), not only must the
classification be reasonable but it must be necessary to further a compelling state interest.
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
638 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1962).
72. 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974). See 52 J. URB. L. 388 (1974).
73. 373 F. Supp. at 369.
74. The Nortown court, however, did not find that prohibition of a regulated use "within
500 feet of any building containing a residential dwelling or rooming unit," DETROIT, MICH.,
OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE 742-G § 66.0103, 1972, was necessary to further a compelling state
interest, the preservation of urban residential neighborhoods. "In prohibiting regulated uses
within 500 feet of a single dwelling or living unit, the Ordinance imposes a greater incidental
restriction on First Amendment freedoms than is essential to preserve and stabilize residen-
tial neighborhoods." Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 371 (E.D. Mich.
1974).
DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE 891-G § 66.0103, 1974 has amended the consti-
tutionally invalid 1972 section by prohibiting the establishment of a regulated use within 500
feet of a residentially zoned district. Id.
New York's proposed legislation has also included the amended change. It provides for a
required distance of 500 feet from a residential district, rather than just a single residential
dwelling or rooming unit and "[tihe distance shall be determined by measuring from the
edge of the nearest residential district boundary to the closest lot line of the zoning lot
containing an adult use." N.Y.C. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS art. III, ch. 2, § 32-461.
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American Mini Theatres II, the Supreme Court summarily upheld
the district court's use of the strict scrutiny test and its finding that
the ordinance did not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment."0 The Court impliedly rejected the Sixth
Circuit's holding in American Mini Theatres P5 that there was no
showing that such an ordinance was necessary or proof that the
means chosen were the least objectionable." The Supreme Court
held that "the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to
experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.""
III. The Twenty-First Amendment-The Influences of Alcohol
Under the twenty-first amendment, a state may regulate the
time, place, and circumstances of intoxicating beverage sales within
its boarders." Because the twenty-first amendment traditionally
has not been confined by commerce clause restrictions,"0 the amend-
ment has been given an expansive interpretation. The power
granted to the states by the twenty-first amendment seems to go
beyond the traditional scope of the state's police power. "[T]he
75. 427 U.S. at 71-73.
76. 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975). See generally 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 657 (1975); 10 GA. L.
REV. 275 (1975); 54 TEX. L. REV. 422 (1976).
77. 427 U.S. at 71-73.
78. Id. at 71.
79. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 42 (1966); Hostetter v. Idlewild
Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam
Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 344 (1964); Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Mahoney
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938); State Board v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59
(1936).
80. Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 460-63 (1976); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter,
384 U.S. 35, 41 (1966); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330
(1964); Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 137-38 (1939). Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the
United States Constitution prohibits state regulation of the free flow of commerce "among
the several states." State prohibition of intoxicating liquors in interstate commerce ordinarily
would be a violation of the commerce clause, but section 2 of the twenty-first amendment
was enacted to insure that states could regulate the transportation, importation, or possession
of intoxicating liquors for delivery or use within their boundaries and thereby remain dry
without fear of violating the commerce clause. See id.
Consequently, section 2 of the twenty-first amendment has been the source of much contro-
versy. Litigation has questioned the limit of the state's power to regulate intoxicating liquors
within its boarders in seeming contradiction to the free flow of commerce, as well as the
authority of the federal government, to regulate intoxicating liquors. See Note, The Effect of
the Twenty-First Amendment on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1578 (1975).
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broad sweep of the Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized
as conferring something more than the normal state authority over
public health, welfare, and morals.' '1 Although this particular
power may be extraordinary, it does not give the states the power
to dispense" with constitutional rights in the area of intoxicating
beverages control.83
A. California v. LaRue
The Supreme Court further expanded the state's twenty-first
amendment police power to regulate the sale of intoxicating bever-
ages in California v. LaRue .84 The Court held that a narrowly drawn
regulation,85 using the state's twenty-first amendment authority,
could prohibit sexually explicit entertainment that "partake[s]
more of gross sexuality than of communication ' s6 in an establish-
81. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S 109, 114 (1972). See also Vintage Imports, Ltd. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 497, 506 (E.D. Va. 1976).
82. Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1964); Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329-34 (1964); Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp.
1304, 1307-08 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Manos v. City of Green Bay, 372 F. Supp. 40, 46-48 (E.D.
Wis. 1974); Escheat, Inc. v. Pierstorff, 354 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
83. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), Hartford, Wisconsin prevented
"the sale or gift of intoxicating liquors to one who by 'excessive drinking' produces described
conditions or exhibits specified traits, such as exposing himself or family 'to want' or
becoming 'dangerous to the peace' of the community." Id. at 434. To accomplish this task
notices were posted in the retail liquor outlets in Hartford forbidding the sale or gift of
intoxicating beverages to certain listed persons. Id. at 435. The Supreme Court recognized
the state's twenty-first amendment power to regulate such sale or gift, but held that posting
such a quasi-judicial characterization without a notice to the person listed or an opportunity
to be heard denied that person his procedural due process rights guaranteed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 436-37.
In a recent decision, Craig v Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976), the Supreme Court held that an
Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of twenty-
one and females under the age of eighteen was an invidious gender based discrimination.
The Court stated that it has "never recognized sufficient 'strength' in the [twenty-first]
Amendment to defeat an otherwise established claim of invidious discrimination in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 462. See also White v. Fleming, 522 F.2d 730, 733 (7th
Cir. 1975); Women's Liberation Union v. Israel, 512 F.2d 106, 108 (1st Cir. 1975); Vintage
Imports, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 409 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Va. 1976).
84. 409 U.S. 109 (1972). See generally Kamenshine, California v. LaRue: The Twenty-
First Amendment as a Preferred Power, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1035 (1973); 12 Duq. L. Rev. 1008
(1974); 61 GEO. L. REV. 1577 (1973); 7 URB. L. ANN. 421 (1974); 1973 Utah L. Rev. 320; 19
VILL. L. REV. 177 (1973). See also Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976). This recent Supreme
Court decision would seem to limit severely the twenty-first amendment's grant of regulatory
powers beyond the purely economic traditional commerce clause considerations. Id. at 462.
85. See LaRue:v. California, 326 F. Supp. 348, 358-60 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
86. 409 U.S. at 118.
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ment licensed to serve alcoholic beverages when the mix of alcohol
and adult entertainment fosters documented anti-social behavior. 7
The regulation may prohibit such entertainment, even though it
would not be classified as obscene under the Roth v. United States"
"community standards" test and as such it would warrant first
amendment freedom of expression protection. The regulation may
prohibit performances classified by their content without violating
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 0 The
Court's authority for permitting this infringement of first amend-
ment rights without any prior judicial determination of whether
such conduct is obscene is "the added presumption in favor of the
validity of the state regulation in this area [of liquor control] that
the Twenty-first Amendment requires."
LaRue does not categorically authorize the prohibition of nude
dancing or nudity per se where alcohol is sold.2 Lower courts have
broadly misinterpreted LaRue to authorize the prohibition of all
nudity in establishments licensed to dispense alcoholic beverages,
without requiring that nudity or sexually oriented performances
partake more of gross sexuality than of communication and without
requiring a showing that the combination of such entertainment and
alcohol produces certain anti-social behavior. 3
In Paladino v. City of Omaha,9" a tavern owner lost his liquor
license after he featured topless entertainment in violation of a
municipal ordinance prohibiting nudity on premises licensed to sell
intoxicating beverages." The Eighth Circuit upheld the ordinance
which was admittedly more restrictive than the regulation upheld
87. Id. at 111. At a public hearing prior to issuing the regulation, there was testimony of
oral copulation between customers and female entertainers as well as public masturbation
by customers within the licensed premises; outside the premises, there was prostitution
involving the entertainers, indecent exposure, rape, attempted rape and assaults on police
officers. Id.
88. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). Since LaRue, the Roth test has been replaced by an obscenity
test outlined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
89. 409 U.S. at 114, 116.
90. See section HI(A) supra.
91. 409 U.S. at 118-19.
92. Id. See Clark v. City of Fremont, 377 F. Supp. 327, 342 (D. Neb. 1974).
93. Paladino v. City of Omaha, 471 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1972); McCue v. City of Racine,
351 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
94. 471 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1972).
95. Id. at 813.
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in LaRue96 in that it prohibited topless dancing per se.97 The court
liberally interpreted LaRue to hold that sexually oriented perform-
ances, whether or not obscene, could be prohibited under the
twenty-first amendment in establishments licensed to sell intoxicat-
ing beverages by the drink. 8 It upheld the prohibition of nudity,
without requiring that the performance partake more of gross sex-
uality than a dramatic performance and without a showing that
such adult entertainment combined with alcoholic beverages pro-
duced any kind of anti-social behavior. The court only required that
the determination of which sexually oriented performance was to be
barred not be irrational.99
In McCue v. City of Racine,'0" the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin upheld the constitutionality of
a municipal ordinance prohibiting nude entertainment in taverns
licensed to sell alcoholic beverages by the drink. 0' As the court
interpreted LaRue, nudity per se could be regulated without any
requirement that the performance partake more of gross sexuality
than of communication. "The very language of the California regu-
lation upheld by the Supreme Court in LaRue refutes plaintiff's
contention that the decision only applies to acts of gross sexuality
and not to nudity or nude dancing per se.'1 02
The courts have expressed their frustration with interpreting
California v. LaRue:10 3
Apparently then the line between the protected dance and the unprotected
can be drawn at a different point when the establishment in question sells
liquor by the drink. A tavern owner seeking guidance from the court's opinion
in LaRue learns only that a performance by a "scantily clad ballet troupe"
is still protected, but "bacchanalian revelries" are not.
The better reasoned cases note the qualifying limitations in
LaRue. Peto v. Cook'04 turned on the illegal seizure of allegedly
96. Id. at 814.
97. The City of Omaha regulation prohibited nude entertainers, waitresses, hostesses,
managers and owners. Id. at 813.
98. Id. at 814.
99. Id.
100. 351 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
101. Id. at 813.
102. Id. at 812.
103. Manos v. City of Green Bay, 372 F. Supp. 40, 46-47 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
104. 364 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
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obscene printed material.'"5 The case involved an ordinance prohib-
iting live sex entertainment in establishments licensed to sell alco-
holic beverages by the drink as well as to take out.' The court held
that the Department of Liquor Control has a valid function regulat-
ing obscenity within the limits defined by California v. LaRue.' 7 It
clearly defined the types of sexual entertainment that may be regu-
lated as those that partake more of gross sexuality than of communi-
cation,'"8 and noted the absence of previous legislative hearings to
determine whether the combination of adult entertainment and al-
cohol produced the anti-social behavior described in LaRue. 09
Following Peto v. Cook, the United States District Court of Ne-
braska in Clark v. City of Fremont"' stressed that LaRue "must be
limited to the facts out of which the case arose.""' Unless the pro-
hibited performance partakes more of gross sexuality than of com-
municative expression, it can not be regulated."' The court con-
cluded that topless dancing or nudity per se is not gross sexuality
but is a protected form of expression."' These performances can not
be regulated without prior judicial determination of whether they
are obscene." 4
B. Felix v. Young
In Felix v. Young,"' plaintiff operated a cabaret that featured
topless dancing without a group "D" cabaret license. The cabaret,
located within 1,000 feet of three other regulated uses, was in viola-
tion of the 1972 Detroit municipal zoning ordinance. Plaintiff sought
to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance. He claimed the zoning
ordinance, as applied to businesses specializing in adult entertain-
ment, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment by creating a classification based on the content of expression
105. Id. at 4.
106. Id. at 3 n.5.
107. Id. at 5.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id.
110. 377 F. Supp. 327 (D. Neb. 1974).
111. Id. at 339.
112. Id. at 341-42.
113. Id. at 342. See Attwood v. Purcell, 402 F. Supp. 231, 234 (D. Ariz. 1975).
114. 377 F. Supp. at 342.
115. 536 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. V
NOTES
offered. As such, this classification was an unlawful infringement
upon his right to unrestricted expression guaranteed by the first
amendment."'
The district court held that the Detroit ordinance zoning group
"D" cabarets was constitutional on its face."7 The court based its
decision on Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs,"5 an earlier Eastern
District of Michigan case which had upheld the zoning regulations
as applied to adult motion picture theatres, adult mini motion pic-
ture theatres, and adult book stores. The Sixth Circuit affirmed
Felix,"9 but on other grounds.2 0
The court of appeals noted a critical distinction between group
"D" cabarets and adult motion picture theaters and adult book
stores. Cabarets unlike adult motion picture theaters are licensed
to sell alcoholic beverages.' 2 ' Based on the Supreme Court's decision
in California v. LaRue, 2 the Sixth Circuit upheld the validity of
zoning cabarets featuring topless dancers, go-go dancers, exotic
dancers, strippers and male or female impersonators as a regulatory
power under the twenty-first amendment. The court reasoned that
the presence of intoxicating beverages warranted the relaxation of
traditional first amendment standards because of the presumption
of validity provided by the twenty-first amendment to regulations
over the sale of intoxicating liquors.2 3 Although LaRue, authorized
the relaxation of traditional first amendment guarantees, it did so
with the specific limitations, which are not present in Felix v.
Young.
Although the Detroit regulation is less restrictive than the Califor-
nia ordinance in that it does not prohibit regulated entertainment
but only restricts the location where it might be featured, it is much
more restrictive than the California ordinance because it regulates
more than explicit gross sexuality. The Detroit regulation broadly
restricts entertainment which does not partake more of gross sexual-
116. Id. at 1129.
117. Id. at 1133.
118. 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974). For a discussion of Nortown, see notes 38-42
supra and accompanying text.
119. 536 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1976).
120. Id. at 1136.
121. Id. at 1131.
122. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
123. 536 F.2d at 1131-32.
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ity than of communicative expression and which does not have to
be topless or even adult.2 4 The twenty-first amendment presump-
tion of validity would probably not permit this increased
infringement of protected first amendment expression even if the
courts found that the prevention of urban decay resulting from the
mushrooming concentrations of group "D" cabarets was a compel-
ling state interest.
IV. Conclusion
Restricting the location of adult entertainment requires a delicate
balance between preventing residential urban decay prompted by
the concentration of businesses specializing in adult entertainment,
and protecting the first amendment freedom of non-obscene adult
expression. Detroit has successfully achieved this delicate balance
through a valid exercise of its zoning power.'25
The Supreme Court has held that Detroit's regulation of the loca-
tion of entertainment on the basis of its adult content is constitu-
tionally valid. The regulation is completely neutral swayed neither
by hostility nor sympathy towards the content of the entertain-
ment. '2 The regulation aims only at preventing proven residential
urban decay, a sufficiently compelling state interest to warrant loca-
tional infringements on protected first amendment expression., 7
The proposed New York zoning amendments are modelled almost
identically on Detroit's regulations except that New York adds a
"plan of amortization" which requires that any preexisting adult
establishment that would violate the proposed amendments be ter-
minated within one year of the effective date of the amendments.'"
New York is as interested in cleaning up areas infested with busi-
nesses specializing in adult entertainment as it is in preventing the
future concentrations of these businesses.' 9
The courts must consider two aspects of the proposed New York
amendments; the 500 foot restriction of adult entertainment busi-
nesses from residential districts3 ' and the "plan for amortiza-
124. See note 13 supra.
125. See notes 20-29 supra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 34-67 supra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 67-78 supra and accompanying text.
128. See note 8 supra.
129. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1976 at Al, col. 4; id., Nov. 16, 1976 at 43, col. 1.
130. See note 7 supra.
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tion."' 13  The 500 foot restriction should be upheld based on the
holding of American Mini Theatres II. The Supreme Court stated
that a municipality may control the location of theaters to satisfy
certain locational as well as other requirements, "either by confin-
ing them to certain specified commercial zones or by requiring that
they be dispersed throughout the city.' ' 32 The New York regulation
is not as restrictive as the original Detroit ordinance prohibiting the
location of any adult use within 500 feet of a single dwelling or living
unit. That regulation had seriously curtailed the possible sites for
businesses specializing in adult entertainment. 131
The plan for amortization poses a more difficult problem. In
American Mini Theatres II, the Court stated, "[tihe situation
would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of supressing
or greatly restricting access to lawful speech. Here, however, the
District Court specifically found that '[t]he Ordinances do not
affect the operation of existing establishments but only the location
of new ones.' "'131 This would seem to imply that regulation of preex-
isting adult entertainment businesses, i.e., the closing down of those
establishments that do not conform to the zoning regulations, would
impose too great a restriction on the access to first amendment
protected expression.
The New York "plan for amortization" does not seem any more
restrictive than the constitutionally valid regulation of proposed
adult entertainment businesses. The plan is basically no more than
a limitation on the place where adult films might be exhibited.
Although it might inconvenience some of the patrons presently fre-
quenting these establishments, the demand will create new estab-
lishments that will be more convenient for other patrons.'35 And
while businesses would be required to close down, they would be
"affected no differently than any other commercial enterprise that
suffers economic detriment as a result of land-use regulation.' 3"
Thus, the "plan for amortization" is a further extension of the limi-
131. See note 8 supra.
132. 427 U.S. at 62.
133. 373 F. Supp. at 371. See note 74 supra.
134. 427 U.S. at 71 n.35, quoting Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 371
(E.D. Mich. 1974).
135. 427 U.S. at 81 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 78.
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tation on the location where adult entertainment may be featured,
.but it does not restrict or prohibit the content availability of adult
entertainment.
Charles T. Fee, Jr.
